Divine Boundaries: How Religion Shapes Citizens’ Attitudes Toward Immigrants

Eric Leon McDaniel¹, Irfan Nooruddin², and Allyson Faith Shortle²

Abstract
How does religion affect one’s attitudes toward immigrants? Scholars have shown that members of minor religious groups are less anti-immigrant than members of majority affiliations and that Evangelical Protestants are particularly hostile. Other scholars have demonstrated that increased religiosity reduces immigrant animus. Here, we argue that religion affects immigration attitudes via a distinct religiously informed interpretation of America’s national identity, which we call Christian nationalism. Christian nationalists believe that America has a divinely inspired mission and link its success to God’s favor. Using social identity complexity theory, we argue that citizens who ascribe to this worldview should be least tolerant of those they perceive as symbolic threats to American national identity. We assess this claim using the 2006 Pew Immigration Attitudes Survey and the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey. Christian nationalism is a robust determinant of immigrant animus, whereas religious affiliation only affects immigrant animus when Christian nationalism is excluded.

Keywords
immigration, religion, Christian nationalism, Evangelicals, economic threat, symbolic prejudice, minority marginalization, social identity theory

¹University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA
²The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA

Corresponding Author:
Irfan Nooruddin, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University,
2140 Derby Hall, 154 North Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210, USA
Email: nooruddin.3@osu.edu
If English was good enough for Jesus, it’s good enough for Texas school-children.

—Miriam “Ma” Ferguson, two-term governor of Texas (1925-1927, 1933-1935)

Introduction

A majority of American citizens believe that there should be greater control of and restrictions on immigrants (Keeter, 2009). Yet opposition to immigration is not uniform across the nation. For instance, to use the Patchwork Nation community categories (Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2003; http://patchworknation.csmonitor.com/about/), opposition to immigration is highest in “Tractor Country” and “Evangelical Epicenters” (Gimpel, 2009). The former is possibly explained by the fact that the agricultural communities that comprise “Tractor Country” are economically troubled and overwhelmingly White, suggesting a confluence of economic and racial concerns with immigration that have been identified in previous research on immigration attitudes. But why would communities with large numbers of Evangelicals be against immigration? A purely social conservatism argument does not hold much water, for interestingly enough “Mormon Outpost” communities, which are arguably as conservative socially, are among the least anti-immigrant.

In this article, we tackle the question of how and why one’s religious affiliation shapes one’s attitudes toward immigration and immigrants. To grapple with the community-level puzzle of variation in how different religious ‘communities’ view immigration uncovered by Gimpel’s Patchwork Nation analysis, we theorize religious affiliation’s effects at the individual level and use individual-level survey evidence to test our hypotheses. Using the symbolic politics and social identity literature as our base, we show that attitudes toward immigrants are shaped by civil religion, particularly by its conservative strain: Christian nationalism. Furthermore, we demonstrate that religious identification’s effect on attitudes toward immigrants is more systematic in relation to cultural preservation. Our article thus makes three important contributions: (a) it provides the first systematic analysis of which we are aware of how religion impacts individual attitudes toward immigrants, (b) it adds to a growing interest in exploring how religion might shape policy preferences on ostensibly nonreligious issues (other examples include work by Knoll, 2009, on immigration policy and Scheve & Stasavage, 2006a, 2006b, on social insurance policy), and (c) it provides a
better understanding of how symbolic predispositions, identity, and self-interest collaborate to shape opinions.

In the next section, we review existing research on religion’s effect on immigration attitudes, and offer a new theoretical argument that emphasizes the role played by a Christian Nationalism worldview that exists in American politics. We test three hypotheses suggested by the existing literature and one hypothesis from our own argument using data from both the 2006 Pew survey on immigration and the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES). We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for existing research and identifying avenues for future research on the causal mechanisms uncovered here.

**Religion’s Effect on Immigration Attitudes**

Conventional wisdom in American politics would not find the Pew results puzzling, as it has become commonplace to assume that Evangelicals will adopt the conservative position on most public policy issues (Boone, 1989; Ellison & Musick, 1993; Hunter, 1983; Wilcox, 1989).

This view is echoed by press coverage of the debate a few years ago over the so-called Kennedy–McCain immigration bill. The majority of Evangelicals wanted to take a hard-line stance against lawbreakers, including support for deportation of illegal immigrants (Cooperman, 2006). This sentiment was exemplified by the chairwoman of the Christian Coalition of Georgia, who stated, “We uphold the rule of law. This has to do with what is legal and what is illegal. God would never condone chaos and lawlessness for he is a God of order, and righteousness” (Borden & Poole, 2006). Likewise, other groups, such as the Christian Coalition, Eagle Forum, and Southern Baptist Association, argued that the Bible supports the protection of national borders and that the Kennedy–McCain bill would provide amnesty to criminals (Cooperman, 2006). Yet, simultaneously, other Evangelical groups offered their support for measures providing a legal path to citizenship, as outlined in the Kennedy–McCain bill. Those who supported this route argued that the Bible encourages compassionate treatment of the disadvantaged. Indeed, this was explicitly expressed in a statement made by the National Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference and supported by World Relief, the humanitarian arm of the National Association of Evangelicals. Furthermore, an organization of Evangelical and mainline Protestants, named Christians for Comprehensive Immigration Reform, called on Congress to strengthen the nation’s borders, while giving illegal immigrants the opportunity to gain legal residency (Banerjee, 2007).
Outside of the Evangelical community, other groups did speak out on the immigration issue. Several leaders within the Catholic Church strongly opposed any measures that would make being an illegal immigrant a felony or assisting illegal immigrants a crime (Reiff, 2006; Zoll, 2006). These leaders, most vocal of whom was Cardinal Roger Mahoney of the Los Angeles diocese, stated that they would openly disobey any law that would support such measures, citing a religious imperative to resist an unjust law, a historic commitment to social justice, and a compassionate approach to those escaping persecution and economic hardship. Indeed, even Pope Benedict XVI spoke of protecting immigrant families and human rights during a visit to the United States (Wakin & Preston, 2008).

Such mixed messages from religious leaders and spokespeople are in one sense not surprising. After all, why should one’s religious affiliation affect one’s attitudes toward immigrants? Is it simply a matter of following the cues sent by one’s religious elders? Or is the relationship predicated on beliefs and ideas that are intrinsically religious? In this section, we detail explanations based on the existing literature and then offer our own argument that is conceptually distinct from extant arguments. We then suggest empirical implications that allow us to distinguish to some degree (though not perfectly) between these explanations.

Attitudes about immigration policies have often been analyzed to determine whether economic or symbolic and cultural aspects drive their ultimate formation. The conclusion of such research places self-interest as of utmost importance when policy effects are real, immediate, and tangible, such as with home owner concerns and symbolic concerns as dominating views on most other types of policy issues (Campbell, 2002; Dixon, Lowery, Levy, & Ferraro, 1991). However, the question becomes less clear-cut when it concerns affect and attitudes regarding out-groups—such as the case with attitudes about immigrants in the United States. Both self-interest and culture have been prominent in explaining opinions toward immigrants and immigration (Espenshade & Calhoun, 1993; Kehrberg, 2007). Therefore, although it would be nice to assume what we know about other policy attitudes applies to this issue, the intergroup threats felt by in-group members (in this case, American citizens) have been shown to be both economic and symbolic. The question we must confront is whether one rules supreme when it comes to shaping attitudes about immigrants. Consider each in a little more detail.

The economic explanation states that an individual’s opposition to immigration is based principally on her or his calculation of how immigration will influence her or his economic stability. Those who have examined immigration from the economic standpoint find that economic concerns do contribute
to attitudes toward immigrants. O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006) find that the skill of the individual as well as the wealth of the nation affects views of immigrants. The high skilled in rich nations are more open to immigration, whereas the low skilled are more hostile. Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong (1997) find that pessimism with regard to the current economy, as well as the fear that immigrants will negatively affect employment opportunities and taxes, leads to support for restrictions on immigration. Alvarez and Butterfield (2000) find that those who saw themselves in economic competition with immigrants were more likely to support California’s Proposition 187, which prohibited illegal immigrants’ access to certain public services. Most recently, Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007) find that greater exposure to the financial pressures brought about by immigration leads Americans to take more restrictive stances on immigration.

In contrast, research emphasizing the cultural aspect of immigration attitudes finds that animus toward immigrants stems from a fear that the newcomers will neither recognize nor fulfill the standards of behavior accepted by those in the host nation (Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Citrin et al., 1997; de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Espenshade & Calhoun, 1993; Fetzer, 2000). Furthermore, these studies have found that cultural issues have a more robust effect on immigration attitudes than economic issues. The prominent explanation for the consistent effect of the cultural attitudes on immigration attitudes is the theory of symbolic politics. Those who ascribe to the theory of symbolic politics argue that an individual’s decisions are not purely driven by self-interest but by reactions to certain symbols (Elder & Cobb, 1983; Sears, 1983; Sears, Lau, Tyler, & Allen, 1980). Such reactions are a product of predispositions learned early in life and routinely reinforced, such as ideology, partisanship, race, and religion (Citrin, Reingold, & Green, 1990). Most recently, scholars have examined how the symbolic aspects of American identity shape attitudes toward ethnic diversity and language diversity. What these studies have found is that people’s reactions to newcomers are mainly based on how they view what it means to be an American (Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008; Citrin, Reingold, & Green, 1990; Huddy & Sears, 1990; Schildkraut, 2005). Believing that outsiders will violate the meaning of what it means to be an American leads to animus toward policies such as bilingual education and immigration (Citrin, Reingold, & Green, 1990; Huddy & Sears, 1990; Schildkraut, 2005).

Both material and symbolic concerns are at work in shaping anti-immigrant attitudes in the United States. But, from the perspective of understanding how one’s religious affiliation shapes these attitudes, the symbolic or cultural argument is potentially more fruitful. Therefore, although our empirical analysis
will be attentive to material arguments, the theoretical framework developed below pays particular attention to the symbolic politics of immigration and the ways certain religious traditions make it more salient, thereby activating immigrant animus.

Existing literature connecting religion to immigration attitudes focuses primarily either on one’s religious affiliation or on the commitment with which one practices one’s faith—religiosity. Those emphasizing religious affiliation highlight different theoretical mechanisms that yield the same expectation that those who belong to the Evangelical religious community should be more likely to express anti-immigrant attitudes than would members who are nonbelievers, mainline Protestants or Catholics, or members of other non-Christian faiths. Knoll (2009) interprets his evidence as supportive of a “minority marginalization” hypothesis that argues members of minority groups, such as Mormons or Jews, are more likely to empathize with other marginalized groups, in this case immigrants.

One can generate the same expectation by considering the issue from the perspective of the majority religious communities. Consider Elizabeth Theiss-Morse’s (2009) important recent analysis of national identity formation. Employing a social theory of national identity, Theiss-Morse argues that those who share ascriptive characteristics with the dominant (or majority) community are likely to consider these as stereotypical of what it means to belong to the nation. In the United States, where most citizens are Christian, it is not uncommon therefore for citizens to think of themselves as belonging to a “Christian nation” simply as a descriptive notion—though we will argue below that this phrase has a very different notion in our framework. But the simple fact of stereotyping Americans as Christians allows for an exclusion of those who are not Christian or who might weaken America’s Christian values and traditions. In one sense, this argument is congruent with Knoll’s (2009) in that it also predicts that one’s religious affiliation should shape one’s attitudes toward immigrants and furthermore that Evangelicals as Christians would therefore also be more likely to be anti-immigrant. Daniels and von der Ruhr (2005) find, for instance, that individuals affiliated with fundamentalist traditions are opposed to globalization and immigration because both pose a direct threat to established culture. However, Theiss-Morse’s (2009) argument does not yield different predictions for Evangelicals relative to mainline Protestants, a group that should similarly consider itself as stereotypical of being American, though it would predict that both these groups should be more prone to anti-immigrantism than Catholics, nonbelievers, or members of other faiths who are not part of the mainstream of American religious life, which is consistent with Knoll’s (2009) findings.
Not all citizens who share a particular religious affiliation experience that religion similarly. Some members are very devout, practicing their faiths diligently, whereas others are often more nominal members. One would expect that the difference in practice—or religiosity—should matter because those who practice their religion more diligently should have a different relationship with their faith than those that do not, with correspondingly different behavioral implications (Green, 2007; Layman, 1997; Welch & Leege, 1988). The deeper commitment of the more devout should lead to greater exposure to the messages of religious elites and, Knoll (2009) argues, to increased tolerance for immigrants because of an internalization of religious teachings about compassion for the disadvantaged. This expectation is borne out in previous research that finds that church attendance is positively related with liberal views on immigration, controlling for one’s religious affiliation.

We do not disagree with the reasoning underlying either the religious affiliation or religiosity arguments described above, but we would argue that the existing literature’s treatment of religion’s effect on attitudes overemphasizes ascriptive and behavioral factors relative to those of ideology. Put another way, the existing literature is silent about how religion might affect what one believes about American national identity and therefore about the appropriate level of and criteria for immigrants.

Religion is an identity established early in life and consistently reinforced (Citrin, Reingold, & Green, 1990). Religion provides a weltanschauung (i.e., a comprehensive conception of the world, especially from a specific standpoint, or a worldview), allowing individuals to make sense of daily occurrences. Religion thus provides a cultural framework that helps individuals understand what actions are acceptable and what are not and therefore plays a central role in shaping social and political attitudes. In addition, religion also demarcates group boundaries that indicate who is part of the group and who is not (Geertz, 1993). These boundaries as well as the rules dictating behavior are noted for establishing highly religious individuals’ low levels of tolerance for those outside the group (Brewer, 1979; Grant & Brown, 1995; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991; Tajfel, 1981).

One’s religious identity can become intertwined with other identities, such as national identity. American history has shown this intermingling from its beginning. Tocqueville noted the importance of religion in the early years of the nation. Numerous studies of American politics and identity note the importance of religion in defining what America is and what it means to be an American. Robert Bellah (1967) brought this to light in his discussion of an American civil religion, which Wuthnow (1988) defines as “the Judeo-Christian symbols and values that relate the nation to a divine order of things,
thus giving it a sense of origin and direction” (p. 244). The American civil religion can theoretically have either a liberal or a conservative strand. The liberal version thinks of America’s particular role in the world as one that is divinely ordained to bring good things to others, whereas the conservative strain views America as holding a unique covenant with God, which requires it to be protected from outsiders and those who would do it harm. We refer to these ideas more generally as Christian nationalism.

Christian nationalism promotes a strong identification with the American nation because of the worldview that America is in a covenant with God (Boyd, 2007). The understanding here is that the American nation holds a special connection with God and has a central role in the divine plan. For the nation to retain this divine favor, it must hew to biblical principles, for the inability or unwillingness to adhere to biblical principles will cause the nation to face great harm (Murphy, 2008). One can further see evidence of this brand of civil religion in the rhetoric that describes America as a “city upon a hill,” thus reflecting the overall religious tone that is embedded within people’s internalization of the concept of American exceptionalism.

We argue that the importance of the United States of America in God’s plan should make those who adhere to this belief system highly attentive to who is part of the nation. They will want to make sure that those who are part of the nation will not threaten its values or take it off its intended path. Individuals seek to protect their most salient identities by policing their boundaries against those who might undermine them (Theiss-Morse, 2009). In the context of immigrant attitudes, this desire is evident in arguments in favor of cultural preservation that take the form of “defending” American identity. What it means for an individual to identify as an American is of course multifaceted, and, importantly, such identification incorporates other identities that are not political despite their implications for political attitudes.

Social identity theory provides a better understanding of the multidimensional nature of American identity. At the crux of social identity theory is the need for individuals to differentiate one’s group from out-groups, with the assumption being that preserving a distinctive and exclusive social group identity is intertwined with conceptions of the self (Tajfel, 1970, 1981; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). The implication is that threats to in-group worth necessarily indicate a threat to an individual’s own identity (Grant & Brown, 1995). However, symbolic threats that provoke potentially hostile opinions toward out-groups have been shown to exist under minimal and abstract conditions of group threat. For instance, early experimental work has demonstrated individuals’ tendency to try to maintain a constant overrewarding of their in-group with more hypothetical rewards relative to out-group
members, which is an effect that is consistent under conditions of arbitrarily and spontaneously assigned group distinctions (Tajfel, 1970). Social identity theorists have concluded that minimal group effects indicating arbitrary differences between groups that provoke threats to individuals’ perceptions of their social identity’s positive worth act as sufficient catalysts for prejudicial attitudes. In terms of national identity as a social identity, any immigrant group will provoke enough threat to be sufficient cause for prejudicial attitudes; however, this has been demonstrated to be even more likely when an individual adheres to a more multifaceted social identity, essentially providing more avenues by which threat is provoked and out-group animus is able to be developed (Roccas & Brewer, 2002).

When American identity is infused with religious ideals, this will increase the symbolic threat level. If the two were not necessarily combined, religious identity might cause Catholics, for instance, to accept fellow Catholic immigrants, whereas Protestants might have animus toward such immigrants. However, our conception of religious nationalism expects that even religious nationalists that are Catholic will have prejudicial reactions to Catholic immigrants, because the implication of intertwined religious and American identity necessarily makes these immigrants out-group members. The fact that Protestants are more likely to identify as religious nationalists causes us to expect that Protestants initially will appear to have large levels of immigrant animus.

These social identity arguments lead us to hypothesize that those high in Christian nationalist leanings should have increasingly negative immigrant attitudes because of the threat they perceive by outside groups that potentially challenge their own values and beliefs. Stated in terms of intergroup threat, an American identity that is infused with Christian religion, conceptions of God, destiny, and religious heritage is a complex identity that, to be maintained, has to fulfill dual roles of adhering to religious beliefs while maintaining national pride. Because of the intertwining of religion and nationalism, immigration threatens their entire Christian national identity by permitting others to alter their exclusive conceptions of what it means to be an American. Then, perhaps by its very nature, this complex form of national identity finds it necessary to assert superiority over out-groups in order simultaneously to maintain positive feelings regarding their own strict religious identity as part of the overall national identity. Although there is a natural inclination for some to relate their American identity to superiority over others, a reinforced identity based on a creed of uniquely religious values and beliefs increases the facets by which one’s own American identity is threatened by outsiders perceived not to share in-group values, beliefs, and norms. Furthermore, immigration and immigrant
populations present racial issues, where research has shown that Evangelicals, specifically White Evangelicals, still hold significant levels of racial animus (Emerson & Smith, 2000; Tranby & Hartmann, 2008), which may further increase their suspicions of immigrants.

With this theoretical framework in place, we return to our initial question: How might religious affiliation shape one’s attitudes toward immigrants? Three distinct hypotheses are plausible given existing research. First, the religious traditions argument would suggest the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** Christians should express higher levels of anti-immigrant attitudes than nonbelievers and non-Christians, ceteris paribus.

**Hypothesis 2:** Evangelical Christians should evince the most anti-immigrant attitudes, ceteris paribus.

Second, the religious practice argument would suggest the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 3:** Frequency of attendance of religious services should be negatively correlated with anti-immigrant attitudes, ceteris paribus.

Our argument suggests a different testable hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 4:** Those who adhere to the Christian nationalism worldview should express more anti-immigrant attitudes than those who do not, ceteris paribus.

Hypothesis 4 has important implications for Hypotheses 1 and 2. First, given its content and historical origins, we would expect that Christians of all affiliations should be more likely to adopt a Christian nationalism worldview than their non-Christian counterparts. Furthermore, adherence to Christian nationalism should be especially strong among Evangelicals, whose religious tradition should make them more comfortable with the hierarchical nature of the Christian nationalism worldview and its assertion that the United States has a special relationship with God, thereby placing it above other nations and groups. Also, the chronic salience Evangelicals attribute their religion to every aspect of life should make them more receptive to Christian nationalism, a perspective that allows them to unite their religious and national identities. But, if this reasoning is correct, existing findings that Christians and Evangelicals are more anti-immigrant than other groups are likely epiphenomenal because they ignore the belief system to which Christians and Evangelicals are more prone but which are distinct from the effects of religious
affiliation per se. In the next section, we first describe the data and methods used to test these hypotheses and then report the results of our statistical analysis.

**Empirics**

We test our argument using two different data sources. We first use the 2006 Pew Survey on Immigration, which contains detailed questions on respondents’ attitudes toward immigrants, to establish the relationships between religious affiliations and attitudes toward immigrants using a nationally representative sample. The survey also asks citizens about their religious identification and, most usefully from our perspective, about whether they identify as “born-again” or an Evangelical. We restrict our sample to White non-Latino U.S.-born respondents who identify as Protestants, Catholics, or nonbelievers. This gives us a potential sample of 1,322 respondents, of which 824 self-identify as Protestants, 336 as Catholics, and the remaining (162) as having no religious identification. Approximately 51% of the Protestant respondents also identify as born-again.

The Pew data help us establish the baseline levels of animosity toward immigrants across Christian denominations, but it does not allow a test of the Christian nationalism argument. To that end, we use a battery of questions from the 2008 CCES that McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle (2009) use to develop a measure of “Christian nationalism.” The CCES provides a nationally representative sample of registered voters, and these questions were answered by 1,000 respondents, of whom 528 self-identify as White and Christian.

Our first dependent variable is an index designed to tap the degree to which respondents harbor negative attitudes toward immigrants. The questions for the index were selected based on previous research on immigration attitudes (see Citrin et al., 1997; Citrin, Reingold, Walters, & Green, 1990; de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Kehrberg, 2007; Knoll, 2009; O’Rourke & Sinnot, 2006; Schildkraut, 2005). We use a confirmatory factor analysis with eight questions from the 2006 Pew survey. Each asks the respondent the degree to which she or he agrees with a given statement. These statements are the following:

1. Immigrants are a burden.
2. Immigrants make government services worse.
3. Immigrants take (wanted) jobs away.
4. Immigrants do not pay their fair share of taxes.
5. Immigrants are not learning English quickly enough.
6. Immigrants are less likely to adapt.
7. Newcomers threaten traditional American values.
8. Need to protect America from foreign influence.

In each case, we recoded the responses so that more “negative” attitudes scored higher. The questions group together well, with a Cronbach’s α of .79.8 Because the individual items load fairly evenly, we use their simple average, which we normalize to range from 0 to 1, with a score of 1 indicating that the respondent was most negative about immigrants and 0 indicating that the respondent was most positive.9 Next, we create two subindices based on the eight questions above. The first, which we call the self-interest index uses the first four questions listed above (α = .67). The second, which we term the culture index uses the last four questions (α = .65).

We use the 2008 CCES data to replicate the aggregate immigrant attitudes scale. The resulting scale is very coherent (α = .91) in the CCES data. In addition, we construct another dependent variable measuring the deviations in the feeling thermometer score assigned to immigrants compared with the overall mean of all the feeling thermometer scores in the survey, which is similar to the “ethnocentrism” measure developed by Kinder and Kam (2010). Positive values thus indicate that the respondent rated other groups, on average, higher than immigrants or, put inversely, was less favorable toward immigrants than toward other groups. Negative values indicate the opposite.

The McDaniel et al. (2009) measure of Christian Nationalism is based on respondent agreement and disagreement with six statements that correspond with the central tenets of the concept. The measures capture support for the belief that the nation was divinely inspired, possesses as unique relationship with the divine, and is at the top of a divine hierarchy of nations. An examination of the measures indicates that there is a significant level of support for them.10

Importantly for the plausibility of the argument that previous studies findings that Evangelicals are more anti-immigrant might in fact be spurious, our data show that Evangelicals are significantly more supportive of the Christian nationalism belief system than other groups (their mean score is 0.64). Mainline Protestants are second with a mean of 0.46, followed by other Christians (0.42), and Catholics (0.39). Further proof of the strong relationship between Evangelicals and this belief system is that 86% of the group fall above the sample mean.

Both surveys ask questions to ascertain the respondents’ religious identification. We distinguish between three religious affiliations: mainline Protestants,
Evangelical Protestants, and Catholics. Each is indicated by a separate dichotomous variable.

In the regression models reported below, our expectation given previous research is that the size of the coefficient associated with the Evangelical Protestant group should be largest. But, we also expect that its effect should be attenuated once we control for adherence with Christian nationalist attitudes.

Table 1 begins by providing a preliminary assessment of the argument. The cell entries in the table are the mean values for the particular group on our Negative Immigrant Attitudes Scale.

The overall averages for the two survey samples confirms that the current national mood is anti-immigrant (recall the scale ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating more negative attitudes, and so means greater than 0.5 indicate an anti-immigrant average). Mainline Protestants evince mean values right at the national average, whereas Catholics are below the national average, and Evangelical Protestants are above the national average ($p < .001$).

One question that arises is whether this difference by religious affiliation and conservatism in negative affect toward immigrants is being driven purely by a single immigrant group (say, Hispanics) or if it is more general. This is especially relevant if, for instance, Evangelical opposition to immigrants is driven primarily by anti-Catholic bias, because Hispanic immigrants are more likely to be members of that group. Table 2 uses a set of questions asked in the Pew Survey about specific immigrant groups. In these questions, respondents were asked how well they believed certain characteristics described Latino or Asian immigrants. The three questions we focus on are “Often end up on welfare: Does this apply or not to immigrants from Asian (Latin American) countries?” “Significantly increase crime: Does this apply . . . ?” and “Keep to themselves and don’t try to fit in: Does this apply . . . ?”

### Table 1. Some Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Affiliation</th>
<th>2006 Pew Data</th>
<th>2008 CCES Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall average</td>
<td>.599 (909)</td>
<td>.551 (594)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestants</td>
<td>.595 (273)</td>
<td>.566 (141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Protestants</td>
<td>.658 (283)</td>
<td>.652 (111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Catholics</td>
<td>.573 (246)</td>
<td>.537 (133)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. CCES = Cooperative Congressional Election Survey. Cell entries are mean values on the index of negative attitudes toward immigrants, which is scaled from 0 to 1.*
Table 2 reveals three interesting patterns. First, quite clearly, respondents are more likely to attribute negative characteristics to Latino immigrants. Second, the one exception to this anti-Latino tendency is with regard to the question of whether the group in question “tries to fit in.” Here, members of all categories in our sample were more likely to think the immigrant groups were not doing a very effective job of assimilating, and Asian immigrants were equally if not more likely to be criticized on these grounds. To us, this suggests that symbolic politics issues of assimilation are important considerations in addition to more narrowly constructed notions of economic self-interest. Third, regardless of the issue or immigrant group, the Evangelical Protestants in our sample are most likely to agree with the negative statement, suggesting that their opposition isn’t simply reducible to anticlericalism.

Hypothesis 2—that Evangelical Protestants harbor negative attitudes toward immigrants—thus appears to be supported by the descriptive data discussed above. To provide a more rigorous assessment, we next estimate a regression model using Pew’s national sample in which we control for possible alternative explanations to avoid any spurious conclusions. First, to test Hypothesis 3, we also include a measure of religiosity, conceptualized here as frequency of participation in a religious network, which previous scholarship finds moderates attitudes toward immigration (Daniels & von der Ruhr, 2005; Knoll, 2009). To measure religiosity, we recode the Pew church attendance variable into three categories: “Rarely/Never Attend,” “Sometimes Attend,” and “Regularly/Always Attend” (see Scheve & Stasavage 2006a, 2006b, for a similar operationalization of religiosity).

Table 2. Attitudes by Immigrant Origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th></th>
<th>Latinos</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>Isolation</td>
<td>Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestants</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Protestants</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Catholics</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion, nonbeliever, atheist</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Cell entries are percentages of respondents in each religious category answering affirmatively to the following questions: (a) Welfare: “Often end up on welfare applies to Asians/Latin Americans,” (b) Crime: “Increased crime applies to Asians/Latin Americans,” and (c) Isolation: “Do not try to fit in applies to Asians/Latin Americans.” Adapted from the 2006 Pew Immigrant Attitudes Survey.
Second, a principal rival hypothesis is that it is the social conservatism of those most likely to adhere to a Christian nationalism worldview that drives their anti-immigrant attitudes rather than the content of that worldview itself. This is especially pertinent given that socially conservative Evangelical Protestants are also expected to score more highly on the Christian nationalism scale. To account for this important alternative hypothesis, we include in both sets of analyses a self-reported placement on a liberal–conservative ideological scale. In the models using the CCES data, we also include a measure of moral conservatism, which is a scale ($\alpha = .71$) constructed from three questions: (a) abortion should be a private matter between a woman and her doctor, (b) homosexuals should be able to do what they want to so long as they do not hurt other people, and (c) there are too many shows on television that make fun of traditional family values.

Furthermore, the statistical model follows existing research in controlling for basic demographic factors, context, and party identification (Knoll, 2009). The demographic factors included are age, whether the respondent is female, education, and total family income. All of these measures are scaled from 0 to 1. For context, we control for region. The South variable is a measure of whether the respondent resides in one of the Southern States. Our expectation is that Southern respondents should be less tolerant of immigrants (Ellison & Musick, 1993). We also control for the prevalence of foreign-born residents in the respondent’s county as well as whether the respondent lives in a border state, which we define as a state that shares a border with Mexico. Finally, party identification is a 7-point measure with 0 indicating strong Democrat and 1 indicating strong Republican. We have no clear expectation for the direction of the effect of party identification, because the national debate has indicated fissures on both sides of the aisle. However, we include it in the analysis because existing research on party identification demonstrates it is likely correlated with religious identification, as well as religiosity. Finally, we allow for state-level random effects, which capture unobserved heterogeneity on the basis of the state in which the respondent resides.

Model 1 in Table 3 reports results from a model of attitudes toward immigrants based on the 2006 Pew Immigrant Attitudes Survey in which our main explanatory variables are religiosity and religious identification, and the dependent variable is the aggregate index of immigrant attitudes using all eight items listed above.

Age, family income, unemployment status, and living in the South have no effect on attitudes toward immigrants. Neither do variables included to capture exposure to immigrant populations. Living in a border state or living in a county with higher proportions of foreign-born citizens has no effect. Higher
education, however, has a statistically significant negative coefficient, which indicates that as education increases, attitudes toward immigrants become more favorable (less negative). This finding is consistent with the literature (Citrin et al., 1997; Espenshade & Calhoun, 1993). Women are also more favorable toward immigrants. Republicans, however, are less favorable toward immigrants, and this effect is also statistically significant at the .05 level.

Even after controlling for one’s partisanship, the respondent’s conservatism has a statistically significant and positive effect on immigrant animus. This is true both for the aggregate index and for the two subindices that focus on self-interest and cultural arguments against immigration separately. Quite

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Overall, Model 1</th>
<th>Self-Interest, Model 2</th>
<th>Culture, Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td>−0.05* (0.03)</td>
<td>−0.04 (0.03)</td>
<td>−0.06** (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestant</td>
<td>0.07*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.08*** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.08*** (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Protestant</td>
<td>0.09** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.07* (0.04)</td>
<td>0.12** (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>0.06* (0.03)</td>
<td>0.07* (0.04)</td>
<td>0.07* (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.00 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>−0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td>−0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>−0.03* (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>−0.22*** (0.04)</td>
<td>−0.27*** (0.04)</td>
<td>−0.18*** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>−0.04 (0.04)</td>
<td>−0.08* (0.04)</td>
<td>−0.02 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment status</td>
<td>0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>−0.01 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.05** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological conservatism</td>
<td>0.18*** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.15*** (0.05)</td>
<td>0.23*** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern state</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of foreign born in county</td>
<td>−0.07 (0.08)</td>
<td>−0.08 (0.08)</td>
<td>−0.04 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border state</td>
<td>−0.03 (0.04)</td>
<td>−0.03 (0.03)</td>
<td>−0.03 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.62*** (0.05)</td>
<td>0.66*** (0.05)</td>
<td>0.55*** (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>66.36</td>
<td>345.45</td>
<td>242.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>146.37</td>
<td>427.28</td>
<td>325.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, two-tailed.
clearly, conservatives are anti-immigrant, which is apparent from the public discourse surrounding immigration.

Finally, in the aggregate index model, religiosity does not have a statistically significant effect, but the religious affiliation variables reveal some interesting results. All three affiliation categories (mainline Protestants, Evangelical Protestants, and Catholics) have statistically significant positive coefficients, indicating that they are all more negative toward immigrants than the reference group of Christians from minority traditions, which supports Hypothesis 1 and corroborates Knoll’s (2009) findings. And, as predicted by Hypothesis 2, the coefficient associated with the Evangelical Protestant category is the largest, meaning that they are most negative. The top panel of Table 4 reports the results of Wald tests comparing these coefficients with each other, revealing that the estimated effect for Evangelical Protestants is statistically different

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Index</th>
<th>Mainline Protestant</th>
<th>Evangelical Protestant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestant</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Protestant</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-Interest Index</th>
<th>Mainline Protestant</th>
<th>Evangelical Protestant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestant</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Protestant</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture Index</th>
<th>Mainline Protestant</th>
<th>Evangelical Protestant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestant</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.32*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Protestant</td>
<td>4.32*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>4.40*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Cell entries are $\chi^2$ values from Wald tests comparing pairs of coefficients reported in Table 3.

*p < .05.
from that of Catholics, but not so from mainline Protestants. Likewise, the effects for mainline Protestants and Catholics are statistically indistinguishable from each other. The results from Model 1 thus support our first hypothesis about the effects of religious affiliation on attitudes toward immigrants. Across a series of different tests, the data consistently indicate that Evangelical Protestants evince more negative attitudes toward immigrants than do members of other religious groups, and that religious identifiers generally are less favorable toward immigrants than their agnostic and atheistic counterparts.

What explains this opposition? We have posited that it stems from a perceived clash of values, and religious conservatives—specifically Evangelicals—adhere to a particular conception of America’s “ethnic myth” and hold stronger norms about appropriate behavior, making them more likely to be critical toward outsiders and those thought to violate these norms. To assess this aspect of the argument, as a first cut, we separate our dependent variable into two parts: culture and self-interest. The Culture index uses four items of the eight in the aggregate index: Immigrants threaten traditional American values, immigrants are not trying to learn English quickly enough, immigrants are not trying to adapt, and the need to protect America from foreign influence. The Self-Interest index uses the remaining four items: immigrants are a burden, immigrants make government services worse, immigrants take desirable jobs away, and immigrants do not pay their fair share of taxes. Each of these subindices is scaled from 0 to 1, and Models 2 and 3 in Table 3 report the results of using them as the dependent variable in our regression analysis.

The results support the symbolic politics framework used here. The regression model for the Culture index fits better than for the Self-Interest index (its Akaike information criterion and Bayesian information criterion measures are lower), suggesting that, overall, Americans’ attitudes toward immigration are driven by a concern over values than over economics. Before we see if this is also true for members of major religious groups, consider some of the other findings based on the control variables. First, as we would expect, those with higher incomes are less likely to express opposition to immigrants on the grounds of self-interest. Second, as in the aggregate model, more highly educated respondents score lower on the negative immigrant attitudes subindices, and this effect is larger on the self-interest scale. Third, interestingly enough, even those who are unemployed are more likely to express their opposition to immigration in terms of cultural concerns than in terms of self-interest, which is wholly consistent with a symbolic politics frame for immigration politics. Finally, opposition to immigrants among those identifying with the Republican Party is more likely to be driven by cultural values-based concerns than self-interest concerns.
Examining the different effects associated with the religious variables in the two models is particularly revealing. Church attendance, for instance, has no effect on the self-interest scale but is negatively correlated with opposition to immigrants on cultural grounds. This confirms previous research by Daniels and von der Ruhr (2005) and Knoll (2009) that religiosity moderates opposition to immigrants. The religious identification variables also tell an interesting story. First, it should be noted that, regardless of the scale used, those who identify with a major Christian affiliation are significantly more anti-immigrant than the reference category of those who are members of minor Christian groups, which is consistent with Knoll (2009). Second, for two of the three groups—mainline Protestants and Catholics—the effects across the two scales are virtually identical, but for Evangelical Protestants, the effect is considerably larger in the cultural index ($\beta_{\text{cultural}} = .12 > \beta_{\text{self-interest}} = .07$). And, it is on cultural grounds in particular that Evangelicals distinguish themselves from the other two groups. The bottom two panels of Table 4 make this clear. The Wald tests for differences in the size of the coefficients across the religious categories reveal no statistically significant differences when we use the Self-Interest subindex. But, when we use the Cultural subindex, the coefficient for the Evangelical group is significantly larger than that of both mainline Protestants and Catholics. These latter two groups, however, cannot be distinguished from each other.

Our analysis of the 2006 Pew Immigrant Attitudes Survey thus offers strong evidence to confirm both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. Members of religious groups are more likely to oppose immigrants, this is particularly true of Evangelical Protestants, and the source of opposition to immigrants is rooted in symbolic politics, specifically a concern that immigrants threaten “American values.” Although pundits such as Samuel Huntington and Patrick Buchanan have been warning for some time that a “Third World Invasion” threatens to undermine American Identity and result in a “Conquest of America,” this analysis suggests that such views are not limited to elite discourse on the right but, rather, characterizes more general fears among White Americans. Furthermore, the results offer partial support for Hypothesis 3, indicating that increased church attendance ameliorates opposition to immigrants that is rooted in cultural concerns but that it has no effect on opposition based on more economic self-interest grounds.

Our final analysis seeks to drill down into the source of the cultural clash identified above. We have argued that adherence to a particular mythology of the nature of America’s founding manifests itself in the form of a “religious” nationalism, which we have dubbed “Christian” nationalism on account of its overtly Christian nature in the American context. In fact, to the extent that we
are correct that it is this attitude that drives immigrant animus and that Evangelicals are more likely to accept Christian nationalism as valid, the Evangelical opposition to immigrants documented above should be attenuated by its inclusion in the statistical model. The Pew survey did not contain the items required to assess this argument systematically, and therefore we used a measure created by McDaniel et al. (2009) using the 2008 CCES survey.

Models 1 and 3 in Table 5 use the CCES data to replicate the baseline model developed above in the Pew data. This provides both an out-of-sample verification of the findings from the Pew data, but it also updates the data to 2008. Models 2 and 4 add our measure of Christian nationalism to the baseline models. We use two different dependent variables in Table 5. In Models 1 and 2, we use the same negative immigrant attitudes scale discussed above. In Models 3 and 4, we use a feeling thermometer for immigrants as the dependent variable. However, to normalize the feeling thermometer across respondents, we follow standard practice and calculate the deviations from the overall mean of all the available feeling thermometers in the survey. Positive values thus indicate that the respondent on average rated all other groups higher than she did immigrants, and, therefore, positive coefficients mean that an increase in the independent variable make the respondent less favorable to immigrants relative to all other groups in the survey.

The results are striking. Model 1 confirms the finding from our analysis of the Pew data that Evangelical Protestants harbor greater animus toward immigrants, as do political and moral conservatives. But when we add our measure of Christian nationalism to Model 1, the Evangelical Protestant and conservatism indicators are no longer statistically significant, and the Christian nationalism variable is positively signed—meaning that increases in adherence to Christian nationalism increase one’s negative attitudes toward immigrants—and highly statistically significant ($p = .000$). Because both independent and dependent variables are scaled from 0 to 1, the substantive interpretation is very clear: Going from the minimum to maximum of the Christian nationalism scale increases one’s anti-immigrant attitudes by a third (33%) of the range of the dependent variable, ceteris paribus. Model 4 adds to the evidence in support of this claim: Controlling for other factors that might affect one’s feelings toward immigrants, going from the minimum to maximum of the Christian nationalism scale increases the gap between one’s average rating and one’s rating of immigrants by 25 points, or a quarter of the entire scale ($p = .000$).

Comparing the results in Model 2 of Table 5 with those of Model 1 (or with those from Model 1 in Table 3 for that matter) illustrates the value of the considering the religious nature of national identity in our analyses of
Table 5. Christian Nationalism and Immigrant Animus (CCES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Immigrant Negative Attitudes</th>
<th>Immigrant Feeling Thermometer Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Nationalism</td>
<td>0.33*** (0.08)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Attendance</td>
<td>-0.03*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.04*** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protestant</td>
<td>0.05 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Protestant</td>
<td>0.08* (0.05)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>0.04 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.04* (0.03)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.16*** (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.13*** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.01* (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Status</td>
<td>0.13 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.12 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanicity</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>0.05 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Conservatism</td>
<td>0.05*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.03*** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Conservatism</td>
<td>0.19*** (0.06)</td>
<td>0.10 (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern State</td>
<td>0.01 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border State</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.45*** (0.09)</td>
<td>0.38*** (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>332</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. CCES = Cooperative Congressional Election Survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Religious reference category is unaffiliated Christians and those affiliated with minor Christian denominations. Adapted from the 2008 CCES.  
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01, two-tailed.
immigration attitudes. In fact, the results suggest that we might misrepresent the effect of religious affiliation on these attitudes when we exclude Christian nationalism ideology from our models. In a statistical sense, this is because Christian nationalism is a true omitted variable of which textbooks warn: It is correlated both with the dependent variable and with our independent variables. Thus, two apparent findings from Table 3 are altered once we include this missing factor:

1. Church attendance, which was not significant earlier, is now negatively correlated with immigrant animus once we control for Christian nationalism views. This accords with Hypothesis 3.
2. Evangelical Protestants appear more anti-immigrant when we ignore religious national identity; once we control for Christian nationalism, the Evangelical Protestant indicator variable is no longer statistically significant. In fact, none of the religious affiliation variables is significant, and Evangelicals are not statistically distinguishable from the other groups once we account for Christian nationalism. Thus, support for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 is substantially weaker than one might have thought based on the analyses excluding Christian nationalism.

These results indicate quite strongly that our understanding of how White Christians in America feel about immigrants is enhanced by a better knowledge of how they conceive of religion’s role in what it means to be American. Future research should build on these findings by deepening our understanding of the linkages between religious practice, affiliation, and ideology.

Discussion and Conclusions

Questions about immigration and the role of religion in America are likely to shape political debate for some years to come. In this article, we have conducted a first systematic analysis using two nationally representative surveys of American citizens to understand better the connections between people’s religious experiences and beliefs and their attitudes toward immigrants. Three findings are particularly noteworthy. First, we find that religious conservatism is linked to more negative attitudes about immigrants. Evangelical Protestants evince more negative opinions about immigrants than do mainline Protestants or Catholics. Second, this opposition is particularly pronounced with respect to cultural concerns. Third, the cultural opposition to immigrants appears to be rooted in a particular understanding of America’s origins as a Christian
nation. This belief, which we label Christian nationalism, finds its adherents most strongly among Evangelical Protestants, making them least likely to be favorable toward immigrants.

Our theoretical framework helps distinguish between two plausible causal mechanisms. The first is that the worldview of some religious conservatives is more orthodox and offers less ambiguity. This leads members to be more critical of those who do not subscribe to their group’s teachings and practices and therefore to be less tolerant of out-groups, of which immigrants are a particular example. The mechanism here, therefore, works through the effect of religious experience on one’s tolerance of out-groups in general, rather than of immigrants in particular.

The second mechanism, which we favor and which our evidence supports strongly, focuses more directly on how religion might shape attitudes toward immigrants per se. More conservative religious traditions have tended to emphasize a particular vision of America as a “City on a Hill” that shares a covenant with God. More liberal religious traditions, on the other hand, distinguish between private and civic religion and do not endorse the vision of America as an exclusively or particularly Christian nation (Wuthnow, 1988). From this perspective, the relationship between religion and attitudes toward immigrants is mediated not just by general tolerance but also by the specific conceptualization of what it means to be American proscribed by a more conservative doctrine. As such, the definition of America is part of the religious worldview.

These two mechanisms do not lie at odds with each other and can in fact be seen as complements. But their implications for our theoretical understanding of religion, immigration, and, indeed, nationalism are quite different. Research seeking to pin them down, therefore, is potentially quite important.

Acknowledgment

We thank the editor and reviewers of American Politics Research for their helpful comments. Earlier versions of this article benefited from audience feedback at the 2007 Southern Political Science Association; the March 2007 Conference on Racialized Religion at the University of Texas, Austin; and the 2009 Midwest Political Science Association. We are grateful to Yoon-ah Oh for research assistance. All errors remain our own.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article.

Notes

1. von der Ruhr and Daniels (2003), Daniels and von der Ruhr (2005), and Knoll (2009) analyze attitudes toward immigration policy, not immigrants.
2. It should be noted that more prominent Evangelical associations, such as Focus on the Family, did not make any statements with regard to immigration.
3. Note, however, that the National Association of Evangelicals itself did not endorse the statement.
4. An excellent example of such an argument comes from Congressman Virgil Goode’s (R-VA) reaction after Keith Ellison (D-MN) chose to take his oath of office on the Koran rather than the Bible. In written statements to his constituents, Goode used Ellison’s decision as evidence for why tougher laws against immigration were required, raising the specter of an Islamic takeover of the American policymaking apparatus and an erosion of America’s Christian roots. The connection of Goode’s concerns to immigration is slightly confused by the fact that Ellison, although Muslim, is not an immigrant. But, it is revealing that Goode, who undoubtedly knew this, nevertheless made the connection to immigration policy explicit in his statement.
5. Other possibilities would have been to use the General Social Survey or National Election Study. The General Social Survey suffers from the fact that it does not offer an individual-level measure of whether one self-identifies as born-again or as an Evangelical, requiring any assessment of religious conservatism to be made at the level of the denomination rather than the individual. The National Election Study, by contrast, provides a wealth of questions to tap religious identity but lacks the depth of questions for analyzing attitudes toward immigrants that the Pew Survey provides.
6. The Pew sample does include members of other religious and racial groups, but the sample sizes of these groups are too small for the purposes of this analysis.
7. We restrict the sample to White and Christian for parsimony. Including Hispanics and/or Blacks and/or non-Christians does not alter the findings, and these results are available from the authors. However, these groups are too small in our data to permit any subsample analysis. Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics for all variables from both surveys used in the analyses.
8. To assess the robustness of our results, we also constructed the dependent variable without the following item: Need to protect America from foreign influence. Our results hold.
9. In separate analyses based on the 2004 General Social Survey (not reported here), we constructed a more policy-oriented measure asking respondents whether they thought the number of immigrants should be increased, held steady, or decreased. Although the broad pattern of results reported below hold with this alternative dependent variable, we prefer the Pew Survey–based attitudinal analysis for two principal reasons: (a) There is comparatively much less variation with the policy measure as only a small minority of respondents (<10%) believe the number of respondents should be increased, and a clear majority (60%) believe it should be decreased and (b) mapping attitudes about immigrants to policy preferences is a complex process and requires a structural equation setup that we are not theoretically equipped to estimate at present. It remains an important avenue for future research.

10. Respondents were asked to state their agreement with the following six statements (% agreeing reported in parentheses): (a) America holds a special place in God’s plan (59.11), (b) The vast resources of the United States indicate that God has chosen nation to lead (37.32), (c) The United States was founded as a Christian nation (89.81), (d) The government should take steps to preserve the nation’s religious heritage (69.37), (e) The United States was established to be religiously diverse (48.84); (f) Success of the United States not a reflection of divine will (63.02). The last two statements are reverse-coded to reduce acquiescence bias. The mean for the scale is 0.48, and the Cronbach’s coefficient $\alpha$ for the scale is .80.

11. In analyses not reported here, we distinguish between pre-Vatican II and post-Vatican II Catholics on the basis of the respondent’s age. This distinction does not yield any noteworthy results.

12. Tests of significance are for $t$ tests comparing the group mean with the national average.

13. Conversely, positive characteristics (e.g., “work very hard,” “do well in school,” and “have strong family values”) are more likely to be attributed to Asian immigrants. Available on request.

14. In results not reported here, we interacted religiosity with the religious affiliation indicators. Increased church attendance has a uniformly pro-immigrant effect for all three major affiliations.

15. We realize that neither the religious identification nor the religiosity measures are ideal. Measures such as denominational affiliation, biblical inerrancy, frequency of prayer, and Bible reading would allow us to specify identification and participation in religious networks more accurately, but unfortunately these are not available in the Pew instrument. However, we do believe that the existing measures adequately capture our points of interest. Future research should seek an expanded measurement of religious identification and religiosity.

16. That is, a test of equality of the coefficients for each pair of religious affiliation indicators cannot reject the null hypothesis that they are equal.
 References


**Bios**

**Eric Leon McDaniel** is an associate professor of government at the University of Texas, Austin.

**Irfan Nooruddin** is an associate professor of political science at The Ohio State University.

**Allyson Faith Shortle** is a PhD candidate in political science at The Ohio State University.